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The agricultural sector remains our Achilles heel
and source of vulnerability … Nonetheless, we
remain convinced that agricultural based
development remains the only source of hope
for Ethiopia. (PrimeMinister Meles Zenawi 2000)
1 Introduction
A powerful strand of thinking about the causes of
long-term agricultural stagnation inEthiopiadefines
the problem in terms of inequality. Indeed, it is
possible to interpret most Ethiopian agricultural
policy initiatives of the past three decades in terms
of divergent views on the extent and consequences
of rural inequality. This article investigates the
hypothesis that (too little rather than too much)
inequality has contributed to agriculture’s under-
performance, and considers the implications for
policy in terms of four alternative pathways for
Ethiopian agriculture.
2 Historical context
Any Ethiopian over 40 years old has lived through
three remarkably different political regimes: the
feudal imperial era under Emperor Haile Selassie;
the socialist military dictatorship of Colonel
Mengistu’s Derg; and themarket-oriented,Western-
aligned democracy of PrimeMinister Meles Zenawi.
Each regime has imposed an entirely different set
of policies on smallholder agriculture, where over
80 per cent of the population makes its living, yet
all three have presided over an agricultural sector
that is stagnant and acutely vulnerable to recurrent
drought and other livelihood shocks.
Following the “creeping coup” that overthrew
Emperor Haile Selassie during the 1974 famine,
the Derg implemented a radical agrarian
transformation based on redistribution of land.
Between 1976 and 1991, all rain-fed farmland in
highlandEthiopia was confiscated and redistributed,
after adjusting for soil quality and family size, among
all rural households.This land reform was motivated
not only by theDerg’s Marxist egalitarian ideology,
but by its conviction that feudal relations in
agriculture had exposed millions of highland
Ethiopians to intolerable levels of poverty and
vulnerability. Redistribution therefore had both
equity and efficiency objectives. It was implemented
as amechanismnot just for breaking the power of
the landlords, but also for eradicating historically
entrenched inequalities in control over land, with
the aim of achieving sustainable increases in
agricultural productivity and rural incomes.
Was the Derg’s economic analysis flawed?
Hindsight suggests that the land reform was a
political success but an economic failure. TheDerg
period is now remembered as a time of
militarisation, war and repression, the worst African
famine of the twentieth century, economic
stagnation and failed development programmes –
villagisation, state farms, forced resettlement.
Redistributing land may or may not have been a
necessary step for enhancing rural livelihoods, but
it was evidently not sufficient.
The Derg’s land reforms did not extend to the
right to buy and sell land, which constitutionally
belongs jointly to the state and the people.Following
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the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, the
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) government maintained the Derg’s
commitment to equality in land ownership. The
EPRDF initiated its own redistribution programme
in the early 1990s, to provide farmland for
demobilised soldiers and to correct for the inevitable
inequalities that develop over time as families grow
at different rates, and young adults leave home and
look for land to start their own farms. Throughout
its rule, however, the EPRDF has maintained an
implacable opposition to any suggestion that
commercial principles should be introduced to land
transactions in rural areas.
PrimeMinister Meles argues that allowing land
to become a tradable commodity would inevitably
result in an ‘urbanisation of rural poverty’. When
the next major drought strikes,hungry families with
nothing else to exchange for food will be forced to
sell their land and, being displaced, will thenmigrate
in enormous numbers to cities like Addis Ababa,
where they will survive in squalor in squatter camps,
with little prospect of securing formal employment.
This is related to the “land as safety net” argument:
even if tiny farms are inadequate for self-sufficiency,
the family plot does provide some proportion of
subsistence needs, and this safety net would be
removed if land canbe sold. Ideologically, theEPRDF
shares the Derg’s opposition to large landowners,
and they believe that commercialising land will
inexorably concentrate ownership in the hands of
aminority. In his end-of-year report to Parliament
in June 2004,Meles announced that theprivatisation
of land in Ethiopia would take place only ‘over
EPRDF’s dead body’.
3 Has equalisation in Ethiopia
gone too far?
Income inequality in Ethiopia is unusually low.The
national consumptionGini coefficient in 1999 was
just 0.28, and was lower in rural than urban areas.
The government interprets this both as a (negative)
indicator of widespread poverty, and as a (positive)
outcome of land redistribution.
The low level of inequality is consistent with the
overall picture ofEthiopia as a very poor country,
with a low per capita income. In addition, the
egalitarian land holding system might have
contributed to amore equal income distribution
in rural Ethiopia. (FDRE 2002: 6)
Theory and evidence from a variety of contexts
suggest that pro-poor redistribution of productive
assets, especially land, can achieve significant
increases in agricultural productivity. In contexts
of imperfect markets, interventions that increase
equality of access to assets should have a positive
effect on the productivity of those who are worst
affected by market failures. Eastwood et al. (2004:
2) hypothesise ‘that very unequal land distribution
(arising for historical and/or geographic reasons),
retards agricultural development by concentrating
much land, in countries still facing labour surpluses
and capital constraints, into inappropriately large
units with high capital/labour and land/labour
ratios’.
However, under certain circumstances,
redistributionmay not result in productivity gains
and could even lead to declines.Dercon (2003: 9)
argues that ‘if growth requires a certain threshold
of local endowments to take off, then poorly
endowed areas may well find it hard to escape
poverty … in densely populated areas such as
Ethiopia or Bangladesh, redistribution or related
policies such as tenure security are unlikely to
achieve much more than a dent in poverty levels’.
Carter et al. (2004) show that in the context of
droughts in Ethiopia and hurricanes inHonduras,
households that fall below a minimum “asset
threshold” are unable to engineer successful asset
accumulation. Scaled up to a community or region,
these poverty traps have implications for asset
distribution. Unlocking the growth potential of
asset-poor areas may require policies that encourage
consolidation of assets into larger holdings (through
ownership, cooperatives, pooling or renting).
Conversely, redistributing land and other assets
equally in regions that have a very low resource
base and are densely populated is likely to have
adverse effects on productivity and poverty: some
inequality may be beneficial for poverty reduction
and efficiency.
So has equalisation gone too far in ruralEthiopia?
The combination of land redistributions and
prohibitions against land accumulation, declining
access to natural resources and community-level
assets (including grazing land and social capital),
and asset sales for food in response to repeated
shocks such as droughts, may have pushed
hundreds of thousands of households in highland
Ethiopia below the minimum threshold of key
productive assets needed for a viable livelihood.
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According to this view, equalisation of assets in rural
communities has contributed to agricultural
stagnation, and is keeping themajority ofEthiopians
trapped in poverty. Fear of future land
redistributions – despite government assurances
that none are planned – has inhibited investment
in agriculture, while legal constraints against buying
and selling land have prevented the consolidation
of small, ‘sub-subsistence’ plots into larger,
commercial farm enterprises.
A national survey in 2001 found that the average
landholding in rural Ethiopia was approximately
1 ha per farming household, but just three-quarters
of a hectare in Wollo and Tigray, where half of all
households owned less than one-half of a hectare,
and 10 per cent were landless (Berhanu Nega and
Samuel Gebreselassie 2002: 35). However, this
survey fails to distinguish between ownership of
assets and access to assets. Rural communities have
evolved a complex variety of oxen-sharing
mechanisms, land-labour exchanges and land rental
arrangements. These informal institutions serve to
reallocate agricultural labour, draught power and
farmland between households that have these key
productive assets and those that lack them.
Despite being officially prohibited until recently,
informal land rental markets have been active
throughout rural Ethiopia for years. A survey in
Tigray in 2000 found that 20 per cent of households
were renting in land, while 39per cent were renting
out some (25 per cent) or all (14 per cent) of their
land (Chiari 2002). Explanations given for renting
out land (ranked) included: lack of oxen for
ploughing, lack of male labour, and lack of seeds.
Conversely, in-renters were mainly farmers with
above average endowments of productive assets –
draught oxen, family labour and financial capital –
which allows them to both intensify and “extensify”
their production. Wealthier households enjoyed
higher crop yields and earned more income from
crop sales, fodder sales and renting out oxen. So
renting in land opens new pathways to further
accumulation for better-off farmers (and leaves poorer
households cultivating less land than they own), but
it also provides an entrée into farming for newly
formed landless households. Having independent
control over land also enhances women’s economic
independence and gives them access tonew sources
of income and food:57 per cent of out-renters in the
Tigray survey were female-headed households with
no access to male labour (Chiari 2002).
4 Pathways for Ethiopian
agriculture
Ethiopianpolicy debates are vigorous andpassionate,
and several current “hot topics” – the Poverty
Reduction Strategy, Productive Safety Nets
Programme andVoluntary Resettlement Programme,
among others – impact directly on agricultural
livelihoods.Although these debates are often limited
to anarrow,predetermined agenda or are invalidated
by unrealistic assumptions about agricultural growth
prospects, on one point most stakeholders and
observers agree: there are no obvious remedies for
the crisis in Ethiopian agriculture. This section
discusses four broad pathways that a future
agricultural strategy might take: intensification,
diversification, commercialisation and
“depopulation”.
4.1 Intensification of smallholder
agriculture
Following the conventional ‘input-output’ model
of agriculture, this school of thought argues for
enhancing smallholders’ access to inputs such as
improved seeds, fertilisers and draught power.This
thinking underpins the Government of Ethiopia’s
extension programme, and projects such as
Sasakawa Global 2000, which channels fertiliser
and seeds to farmers on a revolving credit basis and
has had some success in raising crop yields in some
places at some times.Unfortunately, such schemes
are prone to collapse (or require heavy subsidy)
whenever a bad harvest undermines farmers’ ability
to repay their loans.
In any event, it is not low soil productivity per se
that is the problem, but binding asset constraints
and variability of yields. Cereal production in the
highlands averages around 2 tons/ha if the rains are
favourable, but since chronically food insecure
households cultivate less than one-half of a hectare,
they cannot produce enough food for self-sufficiency
even in a good year. Given the certainty of erratic
weather and failed harvests every few years, these
smallholders are trapped in a low productivity trap,
with plots that are too small to generate livelihoods
from agriculture alone, and recurrent pressures to
convert their dwindling assets into food. They are
focused on surviving and managing shocks from
one season to the next, and have no prospect of
escapingpoverty through agricultural intensification.
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4.2 Livelihood diversification
A key insight of the diversification literature is that
factor productivity within agriculture (in terms of
output/ha) matters much less than the proportion
of livelihood derived from agriculture. Given the
inability of most Ethiopian smallholders to make
a living from agriculture, because of resource
constraints and recurrent shocks, increasing policy
attention has turned to supporting alternative
livelihood activities. The government’s strategy of
‘Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation’
(ADLI) recognises the reciprocal linkages between
agriculture and other sectors, but has had little
discernible impact to date.Recently, the government
has promoted “livelihoods packages” that aim to
support secondary sources of income (such as
beekeeping) by smallholder households, as a way
of supplementing and diversifying household
incomes against drought and other production
shocks.
Another approach to supporting livelihood
diversification within the rural economy is to
promote the growth of small towns. Survey evidence
fromWollo andTigray provides strong confirmation
of the benefits to rural households of being located
within walking distance of urban centres. Towns
provide access to employment, commodity markets
(for food, agricultural inputs, and outputs such as
crops and livestock products), and basic services
(health and education). InWollo, the government’s
decentralisation programme and the proclamation
of towns as district or zonal capitals created local
centres of economic growth that had beneficial
effects throughout the surrounding villages
(Devereux et al. 2003). In Tigray, significant
differences in household incomes and agricultural
production were recorded between villages located
near and far from towns and markets. Income per
unit of land was 62 per cent higher in a village near
a town than in one with similar land endowments
and distribution some 20 km away. A major
determinant of this difference was the application
of fertiliser, which was higher among farmers near
town because of their preferential access to input
credit and agricultural extension services (Chiari
2002).
4.3 Commercialisation of agriculture
Directly contradicting the prevailing preference for
egalitarianism among Ethiopian policy-makers is
the view that some degree of inequality may be
necessary for achieving economic growth and
poverty reduction. Within limits, therefore,
inequality should be tolerated and allowed to rise
from its present low levels. This argument
acknowledges that policies of “equalisation” of assets
have succeeded in reducing inequity in rural
Ethiopia, but at the cost of eliminating
entrepreneurial spirit and opportunities. ‘Getting
agriculture moving’ requires giving incentives to
individuals who invest in farming and develop
businesses,not constraining their efforts.Generating
income will create employment and income
multipliers, increasing the tax base to finance
government investment in jobs and services,
including a more effective provision of social
protection for the vulnerable. At the community
level, this argument applies equally to informal
providers of social protection. Evidence fromWollo
suggests that a collapse in better-off groups within
communities since the early 1990s has contributed
to rising vulnerability and agricultural under-
performance, since wealthier “patrons” are vital
providers of access to resources such as oxen for
ploughing, and of assistance in difficult years, to
poorer community members (Devereux et al. 2003).
One obvious implication of this thinking is that
entrepreneurial individuals should be allowed to
accumulate land, which in turn would suggest
privatising land rights and introducing market
principles to land transactions. This would result
in the consolidation of tiny family plots into large
commercial farms, which might (or might not) be
more efficient and productive, but would also
displace those who sold up. Critics assert that this
is arguing for a return to feudalism, or at least will
lead to a re-stratification of rural communities into
landowners and landless labourers. Others argue
that this approach contradicts evidence for an
“inverse relationship” between farm size and
productivity: assuming this relationship holds,
commercialisation will not raise productivity, and
might reduce it. Two final critiques of this model
are that it removes the safety net that access to land
currently provides for rural households, and that
it comes close to advocating a “trickle-down”
approach to development, which is unlikely to
generate pro-poor growth and sustainable poverty
reduction.
For these and other reasons, the Ethiopian
government is unlikely to favour commercialisation
pathways – though alternatives such as new types
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of farmer organisations are yet to be explored. The
government’s preference for a pro-poor pattern of
economic growth is explicit in its current poverty
reduction programme.
The evidence suggests that there has been a
positive correlation between economic growth
and income inequality inEthiopia. It is important
to ensure, therefore, that more rapid economic
growth does not lead to substantially higher
levels of inequality. In other words, a pro-poor
growth strategy is essential for rapid poverty
reduction. (FDRE 2002: 26)
4.4 Depopulation
Another radical response to the crisis of smallholder
agriculturemight be called “depopulation”.During
the 1984/85 famine, and again in the ongoing –
and equally controversial –Voluntary Resettlement
Programme (VRP), the Ethiopian government
identified land scarcity as the binding constraint
on highland agriculture, and relocation of farmers
to lowland areas as the solution.
Under the current level of agricultural technology
and overall development, areas referred to as
drought areas cannot feed and support the
people currently residing on them…Therefore,
resetting some of these people in areas where
sufficient land and rainfall are available is one
of the basicmeans to ensure food security. (FDRE
2001: 63)
Under the current initiative, the government
plans to resettle 2.2 million people in three years,
thereby alleviating pressure in the land-stressed
highlands and providing “access to improved land”
(where this is available) to families who agree to
move (FDRE 2003). Concerns have been raised
that resettlement is a misguided strategy that has
invariably been implemented badly in Ethiopia –
again, early reports suggest serious implementation
failures with the VRP – and it is therefore unlikely
to achieve its objective of improving food security
among resettlers (Dessalegn Rahmato 2003;
Pankhurst 2003).
In livestock-dominant areas, the government
has similarly responded to recent signs of stress in
the pastoral economy – famine and/or drought in
three of the last five years – by arguing for
sedentarisation of pastoralists along rivers or in
small towns. The Government of Ethiopia’s 
‘Pastoral Development Policy’ advocates: ‘Phased
voluntary sedentarisation along the banks of the
major rivers as the main direction of transforming
pastoral societies into agro-pastoral system, from
mobility to sedentary life, from rural to small
pastoral towns and urbanisation’ (FDRE 2002: 5).
In the authors’ view, “settlement” of pastoralists and
“resettlement” of farmers both respond to an
assumption of binding natural resource constraints
by introducing measures that are inappropriate
and come close to social engineering.When asked
for their views, pastoralists seem less enthusiastic
than their government about choosing a sedentary
future.
The Government wants to settle us, to turn us
into farmers. But we look at the problems of the
farmers in the highlands and we ask why the
Government hasn’t solved their problems.Every
years millions of tons of food aid goes to those
farmers, who are supposed to be growing their
own food. Does the Government want to turn
us into beggars like them? (Pastoralist from
Somali Region, quoted in Devereux 2004: 9)
5 Conclusion
Ethiopian agriculture is at a crossroads – as always.
Which pathway to take? Invest in farming or help
smallholders to diversify away from farming?
Commercialise agriculture and turn millions of
farmers into landless labourers,or physically relocate
millions of farmers out of the highlands altogether?
At best, eachof these options offers apartial solution;
at worst they contradict eachother and fail to address
the underlying constraints – agro-ecological,
demographic, economic, infrastructural, institutional,
political – that have brought agriculture in highland
Ethiopia to its present state of “chronic crisis”.
Taken together, a strategy that combines elements
of the above might make some difference:
agricultural intensification, plus investing in
livelihood diversification to reduce dependence on
rain-fed agriculture, plus promoting small towns as
growthnodes in rural districts,plus some (genuinely
voluntary and well implemented) facilitation of
migration from highly stressed to higher potential
areas.Agricultural commercialisationmight also be
economically sensible and socially acceptable in
some areas. A crucial and often repeated point is
that none of these interventions will succeed without
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a major programme of “investing in the basics”,
especially infrastructure and institutions. Most
fundamentally, however, visionary thinking –
involving farmers and pastoralists as full and equal
participants – is needed about where Ethiopian
agriculture is headed in the long run, and how to
achieve the structural transformation required to
get there.
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* This article draws from two background papers
commissioned for the 2006 WorldDevelopment Report
on ‘Inequality’: Amdissa Teshome andDevereux (2004)
and Sabates-Wheeler (2004). Funding support from
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